Motivation
• Observers claim that some recent events are "just like" a bank run -draw policy conclusions based on this analogy
• We have a canonical model of bank runs -Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and many subsequent variations
• However:
-some critical elements of the common story about recent events are not in the model -(there is also some debate about the policy conclusions of the basic model)
• Goal: build a richer version of the Diamond-Dybvig framework -more directly linked to current events -use this model to inform current policy debate
• Key shortcomings of standard model:
(i) the current crisis is a run by intermediaries, not depositors
(ii) the crisis also has important systemic elements
• I will argue that (ii) is the relevant issue -start with the basic Diamond-Dybvig model
The Diamond-Dybvig model
• Continuum of depositors -each may be patient or impatient -expected utility: φu (c 1 )
• Bank divides assets between storage and investment -investment yields R > 1 if held to maturity -but only yields q ≤ 1 if liquidated early
• Competition leads bank to maximize E[u] subject to feasibility
• A run equilibrium exists under some conditions
The Diamond-Dybvig model: a "bank-on-bank" run • Core bank divides assets between storage and investment -investment yields R > 1 if held to maturity -but only yields q ≤ 1 if sold to outside investors
• Competition leads core bank to maximize E[u] subject to feasibility
• A run equilibrium exists under some conditions ⇒ A "wholesale" run is not very different from a "retail" run (in modeling terms)
• The paper does more than relabel variables, of course -differentiates local bank and its depositors -has location-specific risk that generates a role for core banks ⇒ true tiering of financial system
• However, I would argue that is not the main issue/contribution -I want to focus on systemic effects
The Diamond-Dybvig model: a system-wide run
• It is also easy to model a system-wide bank run
• Suppose there are many core banks -each core bank has its own set of local banks/depositors -depositors in a core bank run if they observe a negative "sunspot" signal
• Suppose all depositors coordinate on the same signal -then a run, when it occurs, will be system wide -but ... is this a systemic run?
-7-• In the model above, there is no linkage between the core banks -systemic ≈ a run on some banks adversely affects other banks
• One approach: payoff externality in liquidation costs ("fire sale")
where L = total assets liquidated with q 0 (L) 6 = 0
• Fire sale pricing ⇒ high return on assets between t = 1 and t = 2 -why don't outside investors buy, drive up prices?
-answering this question is not trivial -optimal policy response may depend critically on the answer
• The paper looks at two theories: loss aversion and moral hazard -8-
Loss aversion
• Return R is random and heterogeneous across assets
• Some outside investors are experts who pay fair value -fixed mass of these investors
• All other outside investors are loss averse -willing to pay the value of the asset in the worst state
• As L increases, larger fraction of sales goes to loss averse investor • Paper is careful not to make welfare statements -but ... we would like to be able to evaluate policy proposals in terms of welfare (2) Theories of q (L)
• The paper considers two specific theories of q (L)
-many other possibilities; how sensitive are results?
• Will any model with q 0 (L) < 0 lead to same policy recommendation?
-probably not
• How can we judge whether the loss aversion theory is really useful?
-personally, I would prefer a theory that does not rely on "funny" preferences
• What other tests should a model pass before I trust its recommendation?
(3) Multiplicity
• The model has multiple equilibria -a "fundamental" run and a self-fulfilling run
• Do the policy conclusions of the model vary across equilibria?
-seems possible (perhaps even likely)
• If so, how can we determine which is the relevant one?
-13-(4) Probability of a crisis
• Paper views the current situation as triggered by an unlikely shock -ex ante probability of a bust ≈ 0, or ...
-bust state was "irrationally ignored" when contracts were signed
• What if the bust state was rationally ignored?
-agents anticipate government intervention following some event(s), make contractual arrangements accordingly -these arrangements can make the event more likely to occur (Ennis and Keister, 2008a,b) • Do the ex post policy prescriptions depend on the cause of the crisis?
-perhaps not, but seems worth thinking about -14-
Summary
• Paper addresses an important issue -builds a model that can be used for policy evaluation -designed to match some features of the current crisis
• Exercise requires one to be explicit about the forces at work -"fire sale" story is very common, but ...
-surprisingly difficult to fit into a standard model
• Results so far are interesting, but more could be done -real payoff is a more detailed evaluation of policy proposals
